Family Tax Splitting : A Microsimulation of its Potential Labour Supply and Intra-household Welfare Effects in Germany by Beblo, Miriam et al.
ZEW
Zentrum für Europäische
Wirtschaftsforschung GmbH
C e n t r e  f o r  E u r o p e a n
E c o n o m i c  R e s e a r c h
Discussion Paper No. 03-32
Family Tax Splitting:
A Microsimulation of its Potential Labour
Supply and Intra-household Welfare Effects 
in Germany
Miriam Beblo, Denis Beninger and François Laisney
Discussion Paper No. 03-32
Family Tax Splitting:
A Microsimulation of its Potential Labour
Supply and Intra-household Welfare Effects 
in Germany
Miriam Beblo, Denis Beninger and François Lasiney
Die Discussion Papers dienen einer möglichst schnellen Verbreitung von 
neueren Forschungsarbeiten des ZEW. Die Beiträge liegen in alleiniger Verantwortung 
der Autoren und stellen nicht notwendigerweise die Meinung des ZEW dar.
Discussion Papers are intended to make results of ZEW research promptly available to other 
economists in order to encourage discussion and suggestions for revisions. The authors are solely 
responsible for the contents which do not necessarily represent the opinion of the ZEW.
Download this ZEW Discussion Paper from our ftp server:
ftp://ftp.zew.de/pub/zew-docs/dp/dp0332.pdf
Family Tax Splitting: A Microsimulation of its
Potential Labour Supply and Intra-household
Welfare Effects in Germany
Miriam Beblo∗, Denis Beninger† and François Laisney‡
May 2003
Abstract
This paper assesses the effects that an introduction of the French fam-
ily splitting mechanism would have on German families’ labour supply
and intra-household consumption behaviour. We use simulated real world
microdata created by means of a ‘deterministic’ collective labour supply
model. The data are generated by a compound procedure of estima-
tion and calibration based on GSOEP data. In a microsimulation the
present tax-benefit system with child benefit/allowance is replaced by a
tax scheme with family splitting. The resulting changes in labour supply
are surprisingly small, even for women. Welfare effects are also modest,
but differ for husbands and wives.
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Non-technical summary
In this paper we investigate the effects of an apparently family-friendly tax re-
form in Germany. We introduce a reform of the present tax-benefit system that
replaces marital splitting, complemented with child benefits or allowances, by
a tax scheme with family splitting, according to the French example. We are
interested in the potential labour supply effects of such a reform, particularly
for married mothers. We would like to know whether the lower marginal tax
rate resulting from the adoption of the family splitting would provide a signifi-
cant incentive to work for mothers and fathers. We simultaneously investigate
the welfare effects within the family and the possible redistribution of resources
between the spouses. For this purpose we use simulated real world microdata
created by means of a collective labour supply model. This model accounts for
the presence of multiple decision centres with individual preferences within the
household. It therefore provides a ‘collective’ representation of the decision pro-
cesses of the household, in contrast to the traditional, or unitary, representation.
The data are generated by a compound procedure of estimation and calibration
based on 1998 data from the German Socio-Economic Panel. The data are used
to simulate the introduction of the family splitting and analyze the changes in
positive aspects (impact on behaviour) and normative aspects (impact on indi-
vidual welfare). In a microsimulation, the 1998 German tax-benefit system with
child benefit/allowance is replaced by the French family splitting mechanism.
Due to acceptability reasons, the minimum tax gain from family splitting is set
equal to the present child benefit received.
The resulting changes in labour supply are surprisingly small, even for
women. Welfare effects are also modest, but differ for husbands and wives.
The main result of our simulation study is that the introduction of family split-
ting within the German tax-benefit system cannot be expected to have a marked
effect on households’ behaviour, except for very well endowed families. Indeed
the existing system of child benefits or allowances in Germany seems relatively
generous for the majority of parents. Its effects are not so different from those
of our family splitting reform with a guaranteed bottom transfer, at least for
the average German household. A switch from marital to family splitting would
have noticeable welfare effects only for high-income households, particularly for
the women in these households. Individual working hours would shift marginally
but aggregate labour supply effects would be close to zero. One reason for the
small behavioural adjustments lies in the small number of children in German
families. In particular, better-earning couples in Germany have only few or no
children. Since noticeable welfare impacts are simulated for multi-children and
high-income households only, the scope for changes seems particularly small.
This finding is particularly striking in view of a cut in the fiscal budget due to
a decreasing tax revenue. Nevertheless, our study underlines that the issue of
intra-household reallocation and redistribution should not be neglected when
analyzing reforms of the tax-benefit system, since a higher subsidy for children
through family splitting would benefit, if any, primarily the poorer parent in
the household.
2
1 Introduction
In comparison with France, the employment rate of women with children is
still low in Germany. The difference in the proportion of mothers holding a
full-time job is particularly striking: for 21 percent of German couples with
children under age 15, both parents were employed full-time in 1996 whereas
the corresponding figure for France was 36 percent (Dingeldey, 2002). This
pattern seems to persists even when looking at more recent data. Although
the OECD reports a gap in the participation rate of mothers with two and
more children of merely 2.5 percentage points in 2000, the proportions of those
working part-time differ starkly with 60 percent for Germany and 32 percent
for France (OECD 2002, p. 77f). At the same time, fertility in Germany is as
low as 1.36 children per woman (OECD 2003, Table GE4.1). France, on the
contrary, combines employment of mothers with a relatively high birth rate of
1.89, compared to the average in the European countries.
Reasons for these observed differences may lie, among others, in the differ-
ent tax-benefit systems of the two countries. Among the usual suspects are
particularly those regulations that are related to the family status and the pres-
ence of children in the household. While the tax-benefit systems of Germany
and France are both set up to follow the principle of ability to pay (Leistungs-
fähigkeitsprinzip), with the implication that the fraction of household income
needed to support a child should not be subject to taxation, the application of
this principle differs between the countries. Germany combines joint taxation
of married couples with the payment of a lump-sum child benefit, or alterna-
tively a child-related tax exemption. Due to the progression in the tax scheme,
low-income households generally opt for the benefit, whereas the tax exemp-
tion is chosen by high-income earners. The French system is characterized by
a relatively small means-tested child benefit, and joint taxation of all family
members. The “quotient familial” (family splitting factor) takes account not
only of married adults but also of the number of children in the household.
This apparently generous taxation of families is meant to produce horizontal
equity between households with and without children (see Sterdyniak, 1992).
The fact that high-income households benefit most from the lower tax-liability
(in absolute terms) due to progressive taxation is seen as providing an incentive
for women to work and contribute to the household income.
Reforms of family taxation are brought up time and again in the public de-
bate in Germany. Experts from various disciplines and political parties have
been thinking of introducing variants of family splitting in the actual German
tax system. Putting more weight on children’s needs when determining a house-
hold’s tax liability is seen as a promising measure for a family-friendly policy.
Starting off from this discussion on the appropriate taxation of families, the aim
of our paper is to assess the effects of an application of a French-type family
splitting to the German tax-benefit system.
We are interested in the potential labour supply effects of such a reform,
particularly for married mothers. We would first like to know whether the lower
marginal tax rate resulting from the adoption of the family splitting would
provide a significant incentive to work for mothers and fathers. Second, we
simultaneously investigate the welfare effects within the family and the possi-
ble redistribution of resources between the spouses. Reforms of the tax-benefit
system are likely not only to have an impact on households’ living conditions
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but also on individuals’ and families’ labour supply and consumption behaviour
as well as on the intra-household distribution of resources. For the analysis of
such intra-family effects, a model is needed that accounts for the presence of
multiple decision makers within the household. In this respect, an appealing
representation of the decision process of the household is the collective frame-
work, introduced by Chiappori (1988, 1992), and Apps and Rees (1988). In
contrast to the traditional, or unitary, approach this type of model considers
several decision makers in the household with individual (and possibly conflict-
ing) preferences. Therefore, drawing on the collective framework opens up the
possibility to infer aspects of the within-household welfare implications of policy
changes that can be crucial in determining household choices. In an extension
of Chiappori’s basic model Beninger (2000) and Donni (2003) allow for convex
budget constraints. Beninger and Laisney (2002) provide an application with
simulated data. In this paper we draw on Beninger, Laisney and Beblo (2003)
who propose a further extension with non-convex budget sets.
Among the existing studies on the effects of family-related reforms of the
tax-benefit system in Germany, Althammer (2000) and Wagenhals and Kraus
(1998) have looked at the introduction of a family splitting. Their analyses are
based on household utility maximization and thereby neglect any redistribution
activities within the family that may be caused by the reform. In our study we
would like to draw a comprehensive picture including also the intra-family labour
supply and welfare effects of a tax reform that introduces family splitting. For
this purpose we use simulated real world microdata that have been created by
means of a ‘deterministic’ collective labour supply model (Beninger, Laisney and
Beblo, 2003). Our real world collective data have been estimated and calibrated
so as to reflect the characteristics (with respect to labour supply and disposable
household income) of couples of the 1998 wave of the German Socio-Economic
Panel (GSOEP).
The outline of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we describe the simplified
version of the 1998 German tax-benefit system with joint taxation of couples
that will serve as the baseline of our analysis. Section 3 introduces the tax reform
under consideration, that is, our adaptation of the French family splitting to the
baseline tax-benefit system. In Section 4 the characteristics of our collective data
set are described. The simulation results under family splitting are presented in
Section 5. We compare labour supply and consumption of all decision makers
in the household in the baseline situation with the simulated effects of the tax
reform. Section 6 concludes.
2 The baseline German tax-benefit system
Germany has a personal income tax system administered at the federal level and
regulated by the Personal Income Law (Einkommensteuergesetz). The German
tax system is characterized by a comprehensive tax that covers labour earnings
as well as income from other sources such as capital investment, housing rents
etc. and by joint taxation for married couples. For our exercise we use a
simplified form of the 1998 German tax and benefit system that is described in
detail in Table 1.1
1This simplification is an adaptation, to our particular sample and emphasis, of the mi-
crosimulation program developed at ZEW (for a description see Jacobebbinghaus 2003).
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The function applied to the tax base is smoothly progressive. In Germany, as
in France, the tax schedule used is the same for singles and for couples. However
for couples, the “Ehegattensplitting” method (marital splitting) is used: the tax
rate is applied to half of the joint taxable income, and the outcome is doubled in
order to obtain the total income tax liability of the spouses. Tax rate progression
and marital splitting lead to a relative advantage for married couples if spouses
have unequal incomes.
The most important issue for this study is how children are considered in
household taxation.2 Parents can opt for either a child benefit (DM 220 for the
first and the second child, DM 300 for the third and DM 350 from the fourth
child on) or a child allowance, that is a lump-sum deduction of DM 6,912 for
each child up to age 27, if still in education or doing military or civil service.
Due to the progressive tax scheme the child benefit is less, and the tax deduction
is more, favourable for high-income households.
Social benefits are means-tested and depend on the number of people in the
household.3 As a simplification, we assume that the maximum social benefit
(including housing benefit and special payments) a person can receive is DM
1,000 a month and DM 700 for the partner.4 In addition there are age-dependent
supplementary payments for children. The amount of the transfer depends
on the level of earned income (“anrechnungsfreies Erwerbseinkommen”) and
is degressive, depending on the relevant income measure. In addition, social
benefits are related to the geographical location, since they are paid by the local
governments and housing benefits depend on the average rent of the locality.
We distinguish only between East- and West Germany, and approximate that
social benefits are 10% lower in the East. The difference between East- andWest
Germany stems from the lower costs of living in the East: a substantial fraction
of the social benefit is the housing benefit. Finally, social benefit payments
depend on the wealth situation of the household, and child benefits are deducted
from social benefit payments.
As a graphical illustration of the tax-benefit system described above, Figure
1 depicts a typical situation for a couple with two children. The husband has
an hourly wage rate of 25 euro, the wife earns 18 euro per hour. The household
does not dispose of any capital inflows or income from rental or leasing. It is
therefore eligible for means-tested social benefits at low labour income. The
parents receive child benefit for both children. From a yearly gross income of
just above 80,000 euro they will opt for child allowance instead, as the tax relief
exceeds the lump-sum benefit payment. Figure 1 also reveals the non-convexity
of the resulting budget constraint when labour earnings are high enough for
social benefit payments to cease.
2For convenience, the tax rules, and also our tax program, are written in DM rather than
in euro as the non-linear 1998 German tax scheme is only available in DM (1 euro = 1.95583
DM). All other nominal magnitudes in the paper will be given in euro.
3 In our static setting we ignore unemployment insurance and unemployment benefits which
are both related to former earnings. Both transfers actually require the search of, and the
willingness to take up, a job.
4The maximum social allowances we apply for both parts of Germany are based on the
average effective maximum social benefits paid in 1998 (see Statistisches Bundesamt, 2001).
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Table 1: Simplified tax-benefit system for household taxation, Germany 1998
(married couples)
Taxable income
earnings
capital income
income from rental and leasing
maintenance payments from ex-partner
Tax reliefs
DM 4,000 standard deduction for earnings(a)
DM 12,000 standard deduction for capital income
DM 216 standard special expense deduction
child allowance (or child benefit alternatively)
exemption for social security contribution (“Vorsorge”)
maintenance payments to ex-partner
Tax base: Taxable income - Tax reliefs
Tax schedule: Tax rate applied to half the tax base:
Income (X) bracket Income tax liability
0-12,365 0
12,366-58,643 (91.19·Y+2,590)·Y
58,644-120,041 (151.96·Z+3,343)·Z+13,938
>120,041 0.53·X-22,843
X=rounded taxable income, Y=(X-12,312)/10,000, Z=(X-58,590/10,000)
solidarity supplement: tax scaled up by a factor of 1.055 (b)
Net Income: gross income - twice the tax liability
Benefits
child benefit: DM 220 for 1st and 2nd child, DM 300 for 3rd,
DM 350 from 4th child on (or child allowance alternatively)
means tested social benefits (incl. housing benefit and special payments):(c)
DM 1,000 in the West, DM 900 in the East.(d)
means tested social benefits for partner and children, depending on age
Maintenance
maintenance payments to children, ex-partner
or parents outside the household
Disposable income: net income + benefits - maintenance(e)
Notes: (a) The tax scheme is given in DM because of the non-linearity of the tax
function. Since 2000, the tax scheme is given in DM and euro by the Federal Govern-
ment. 1 euro = 1.95583 DM. Time unit is the year. (b) The solidarity supplement for
the reconstruction of East Germany (“Solidaritätszuschlag”) is based on a measure
of taxable income that includes the child allowance whether or not parents opt for
it. (c) For lack of information on the stock of savings etc., we assume that couples
having more than DM 600 capital income or more than DM 4,800 rental income per
year are not eligible for social benefit payments. (d) These numbers are based on the
average effective maximum social benefit paid in 1998. (e) Social security contribu-
tions, although largely compulsory, are taken as consumption expenditures and are not
deducted from disposable income. Admittedly, the different types of social security
contributions paid in Germany certainly have different consumptive aspects, and our
assumption is probably more appropriate for payments to the pension system than for
health insurance contributions.
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Figure 1: The 1998 German tax-benefit system.
This figure iIllustrates the situation of a couple with two children. The wife and the
husband earn 18 respectively 25 euro per hour. They potentially receive means tested
social benefit.
3 Introducing family splitting
Based on the 1998 German tax scheme with joint taxation of couples, we now
introduce a family splitting factor similar to the “quotient familial” of the French
tax system while abolishing the existing child benefit/allowance.
3.1 Family splitting in France
France introduced a progressive income tax system in 1911. Family splitting
has been applied since 1948, with the aim to adapt the fiscal contribution of
the household to its financial ability, taking into account the total number of
household members, including children. Thus, going beyond joint taxation of
married couples, each child in the household adds to the tax quotient of the
family.5 Whereas the parents are each counted as one, the first and the second
child both add one half to the quotient. From the third child on, the tax factor
is increased by a full point to take account of the over-proportional increase in
the costs of living of a large family (a point which is open for discussion) and
the decreasing benefit of the splitting (see Table 2). Compared to international
equivalence scales used in the literature on inequality measurement, the equiv-
alent scales used by the French family splitting method is more favourable for
families with a large number of children.
A main critique addressed to the French family splitting, e.g. by Atkinson
et al. (1988), is that it mainly benefits the richest, thereby neglecting vertical
5The system applies to cohabiting couples as well.
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Table 2: Equivalence scale for the "quotient familial" in 1998
Number of children Number of shares
0 2
1 2.5
2 3
For each child from the 3rd child on +1
Note: Until 1982 the household gained a full point only for the third child.
equity.6 In order to face these critiques, several additional measures have been
applied. First there is a maximum tax saving of 1,677 euro per additional half-
point to the family quotient in 1998. Second, poorer households may receive
several complementary benefits (young child allowance - “allocation pour jeune
enfant”, - family supplement - “complément familial”) which can potentially
be added to the basic child benefit, depending on family income. Sterdyniak
(1992) argues that the French family splitting provides a certain equity among
families with comparable endowments. However the costs of children are not
fully compensated by the lower tax liability resulting from the family quotient,
so that among high-income households, horizontal equity is not fully respected.
The French tax system combines horizontal and vertical equity, up to the
critiques mentioned above. With respect to vertical equity it is argued that
the current system may encourage highly educated women with a high earnings
potential to have children, as the cost of a child is lowered by the progressive
benefit of the family splitting. Moreover, mothers are encouraged to continue
working because the over-proportional tax loss due to the convexity of the tax
function is smoothed by the application of the family quotient. Recent debates
on tax policy in France revolve around the linearisation of the tax function,
which would abolish the relative advantage of the family splitting factor.
3.2 Application to Germany
In our application of the family splitting factor to Germany, we consider that
the minimum tax gain from family splitting must not be lower than the current
child benefit received, because of acceptability reasons. The latter corresponds
to the amount of child benefit the parents would receive only for those children
living in the household, according to the 1998 benefit system. Hypothetically,
parents have the choice either to receive child benefits - marital splitting is
then applied when computing the family’s tax liability - or to benefit from
family splitting. The ceiling advantage of the family splitting is - somewhat
arbitrarily - fixed at twice the potential child benefit.7 Hence, under the reform,
the total transfer a household can receive consists of social benefits only (plus
maintenance payments), since the child benefit is already integrated in the tax
liability. Note also that the reform is not designed to satisfy revenue neutrality.
6Therefore Glaude (1991) e.g. proposed an alternative tax-benefit system, closer to those
applied in other European countries. Family splitting would be replaced by a generous means-
tested child benefit. Poor families would be further supported by revenue and household size
dependent benefits.
7Variations of this ceiling advantage do not change the results, though.
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Figure 2: Change in disposable household income, family splitting versus 1998
German tax-benefit system (marital splitting + child benefit/allowance).
In a static comparison, Figure 2 illustrates the increase in disposable house-
hold income, given gross income and number of children, if a family splitting
system as described replaced the baseline 1998 system with marital splitting
and complementary child benefits or allowances. The family splitting tax gain
increases with household income and number of children. In the middle-income
range from 40 to 75 thousand euro annual income, few-children households
would benefit most from the reform since the child benefit in the baseline is in-
creasing (higher child benefit for the third, fourth... child than for the first and
second) while the marginal tax gain through family splitting is decreasing with
the number of children. The pictures reverses for high-income households. The
graph underlines substantial gains for multi-children and high-income house-
holds (from 80,000 euro annual income) who would be eligible for child benefits
otherwise. The difference in net household income reaches a maximum of up to
6,500 euro per year for an annual income of 90,000 to 120,000 depending on the
number of children. This maximum is as high as the annual sum of child ben-
efits and refers to the ceiling advantage of family splitting applied. For those
families who would opt for child allowances in the base system, the tax gain
decreases with rising income and levels out at the difference between the ceiling
advantage from family splitting and the maximum tax advantage through child
allowances.
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4 Collective microdata for Germany
There exists no data set for Germany that contains, at the same time, in-
formation on family members’ individual labour supplies, wage incomes and
consumption levels. In order to analyze intra-household time allocation and re-
source distribution we therefore have to ”adjust” existing data to our needs. To
obtain a data set that represents collectively behaving households in Germany,
we proceed according to Beninger, Laisney and Beblo (2003). We start from
the 1998 wave of the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP), a representative
panel data set of households and individuals living in Germany. The panel gives
a wealth of information on the labour market status of individuals and on the
various income sources of families. We select German nationals aged 25 to 55.
All are employees with contractual working hours of at least 10 hours per week
or voluntarily out of employment. The restriction on hours is introduced to
avoid extraordinary high wage rates obtained as the ratio of earnings over hours
for people with less than 10 hours. We exclude those self-employed, recipients
of pension payments, as well as individuals in parental leave, or in education, or
registered as unemployed. We thus select 1332 families living in a one- or two-
generation household composed of a married couple and (possibly) dependent
children who may also live outside the household.
Beninger et al. estimate preference parameters for single men and women
and then predict their labour supply and the corresponding consumption level.
This involves a calibration method to determine the partners’ relative weights in
the household, also called the sharing rule or the power index, as well as a leisure
interaction coefficient describing the effect of the leisure of the spouse on each
individual’s utility. The calibration is done by optimising the fit of predicted to
observed hours of work. The introduction of the cross leisure term relaxes the
strong assumption of separability of individual preferences in the pairs (cf , lf ) ,
(cm, lm) which is usually made in the empirical literature on collective models.
Apart from this cross leisure term, married individuals are assumed to have the
same preferences as singles with the same characteristics. Beyond the calibration
of the power index, an estimation step allows to obtain the expected value of
the power index given a set of variables which includes characteristics of the
tax-benefit system: this step allows predictions of the changes induced by a
reform for the power index in each household. For completeness, we summarize
the procedure in the Appendix.
This compound procedure of calibration and estimation yields a microdata
set very similar to the GSOEP sample (in terms of individual labour supply
choices), but generated according to collective rationality in household be-
haviour. That is, with our knowledge about individual preferences, and the
partners’ weights in the household as a function of the tax system, we are now
able to predict reactions induced by a reform not only in household behaviour,
but also of individual family members regarding their labour supply and con-
sumption decisions.
5 Simulation results
Simulation results are presented for changes of the power index, that is the
spouses’ weights in the household, changes in labour supply and intra-household
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Table 3: Power index pre- and post-reform
West East
Number of children 1998 tax family splitting 1998 tax
1 .50768 .50755 .4454
2 52292 .52289 .4790
≥ 3 .53199 .53215 .5090
Notes: Means of the pre- and post reform power index by number of children for West
Germany. For East Germany, the power index is the same after the reform since the
variable yd is not significant in the Eastern part of the country.
welfare.
5.1 Changes in the power index
The predicted power index depends on a variable which reflects the wife’s relative
net earning power. The wife’s net earning potential yf measures the expected
increase in household disposable income if the wife switches from 0 to 40 hours,
the expectation being taken over the male hours distribution (see the Appendix
for a formal definition). The variable ym, giving the male’s net earning potential,
is computed similarly. We then define the ‘relative net earning power of the
wife’s, yd, as:
yd = yf/ym. (1)
Naturally, this ratio depends on the tax-benefit system. As documented in the
Appendix, the man’s power index is significantly negatively affected by this vari-
able, for West German households, but no effect was found in the East. Thus,
for West German households the power index will be affected by changes in the
tax system that alter the spouses’ earning capacities, such as the introduction
of a family splitting factor.
The relevance of the power index in intra-household decision making is il-
lustrated in Figure 3. If the reform expands the utility set of the couple, due
to lower tax liabilities for instance, the Pareto frontier will move outward. This
improvement at the household level does not tell us much about the effect on
the individual utilities of the spouses, though. In the collective world, the effect
of a change in the budget constraint can be decomposed in two components:
the first one is a standard income effect due to the increase of household wealth
(shift of the Pareto frontier, dark arrow). The second one is the redistribution
effect, accounted for only in the collective framework and reflecting the change
of the spouses’ relative weights that are affected by the variable yd (move on the
Pareto frontier, light arrow). If a tax reform increases the wife’s relative earning
potential, she will gain weight in the intra-household distribution of resources
(move to the left on the Pareto frontier), as depicted in Figure 3.
From Table 3 we see that the husband’s power index increases with the
number of children in the household. This is true for East and West Germany.
The introduction of family splitting, however, affects only the West German
households in our sample. Nonetheless, the relative weights of wife and hus-
band hardly vary, meaning that the intra-family allocation and distribution of
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                    maxfU
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Figure 3: Shift of, and move on the Pareto frontier due to a reform
resources are not altered very much under the proposed reform. For East Ger-
many we do not expect any pure collective effect, since the only variable sensi-
tive to the tax system, the wife’s relative net earning power, is not significantly
related to the power index (see Table 9 in the Appendix).
5.2 Changes in participation and working hours
Table 4 compares the working hours of women with children before and after
the reform, aggregated in 10-hours categories. The introduction of the family
splitting does not seem to have a large impact on the labour supply of married
women (and affects men even less). The majority of women is still concentrated
at zero, 20 or 40 work hours, with not much variation among these categories
after the reform.8
Small changes in hours, however, do occur as becomes evident when looking
at more disaggregate numbers. Table 5 documents joint changes in the labour
supply of wives and husbands, distinguishing a decrease of working time by
more than 5 hours, 1 to 5 hours and the symmetric increases. We see that the
reform leads to an hours adjustment of only one of the spouses in most cases.
Relatively more adjustments are made by wives than by husbands and most
changes are fewer than 6 hours. Nevertheless, a salient feature also of this table
is that the most frequent cell is (0,0), with about 93 percent of the households
where neither husband nor wive change labour supply due to the adoption of
the family tax splitting system.
8We allow for a change in working time by ± 0,1,2,5,10 or 20 hours.
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Table 4: Wives’ working hours pre- and post-reform
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 total
0 33.98 0.48 0.10 31.95
10 0.29 13.80 0.10 9.94
20 0.19 18.15 0.58 19.02
30 0.10 13.03 0.19 12.55
40 0.10 0.10 16.99 0.10 26.06
50 0.19 1.35 0.39
60 0.19 0.10
total 31.76 10.33 19.31 12.55 25.39 0.58 0.10 n=1036
Notes: Rows: pre-reform, Columns: post-reform. Working hours are aggregated in 10-
hours categories. Entries in the body of the table and in the margins give percentages,
the last cell contains the number of observations.
Table 5: Change in working hours of couples: wife vs. husband
-5 to -1 0 1 to 5 > 5 total
< -5 0.10 0.19 0.10 0 0.39
-5 to -1 0.10 1.16 0.10 0 1.35
0 0.10 93.05 0.19 0.10 93.44
1 to 5 0.10 3.38 0.48 0 3.96
> 5 0.10 0.39 0.39 0 0.87
total 0.48 98.17 1.25 0.10 n=1036
Notes: Rows (columns) give the percent change in the working hours of wives (hus-
bands).
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Table 6: Aggregate effects by number of children
1 child 2 children ≥ 3 children
Average change in wife husband wife husband wife husband
Consumption (%) 0.42 0.10 0.23 0.35 0.17 0.50
Participation (%) 0.61 0.00 0.31 0.00 2.63 0.00
Working time, all (%) 0.47 0.04 0.32 0.05 2.29 0.17
Work. time, participants (%) 0.34 0.04 0.18 0.05 -0.71 0.17
Notes: 1036 observations: 410 households with 1 child, 478 households with two chil-
dren and 148 households with at least three children.
Table 6 summarises the consumption and labour supply effects of the family
splitting reform for mothers and fathers of one child, two children or three and
more children. Under family taxation the participation rate of married women
with one child decreases by 0.6 percent from 75 percent in the baseline situation.
About the same percentage of mothers with two children is employed before and
after the reform (60 percent). They hardly adjust to the new system, whereas
those with three and more children show an increase in participation of 2.6
percent under family splitting. While the participation of husbands does not
change at all, their relative change in consumption is slightly larger (for 2 and
more children) than that of the wives. Work hours are also adjusted under
family taxation. The largest change is observed in multi-children families where
mothers increase their working time by 2.3 percent on average, while fathers
add less. This change is due original non-participants. When we consider only
those women working in the baseline, working hours even decrease with family
splitting. Our overall conclusion therefore is that, while changes in consumption
levels and hours of work do differ across household types, they are rather small
on the whole.
It is important to note that our version of this tax reform is not revenue
neutral. In fact, tax revenues are diminished in the family splitting system, since
all childless singles and couples still pay the same tax amount, while households
with children experience a tax gain on average. Hence, all effects also have to
be evaluated in view of a shrinking fiscal budget. Total tax revenues amount to
734.6 million euro before the reform and 591 after the reform (projected for our
population of German couples aged 25 to 55). Our results therefore represent
an upper bound on behavioural adjustments rather.
5.3 Normative aspects of the reform: changes in welfare
We now look at the individual welfare effects of the reform measured for hus-
bands and wives separately. These effects are illustrated by the distribution of
percentage changes in individual utility for every decile of the pre-reform dis-
tribution of the household equivalent disposable income (in Figures 4 and 5).9
The graphs show the mean, the median and the 10th and 90th percentiles of the
change-in-utility distribution. The inter-decile and median curves reveal that
9The equivalence scale for the household disposable income is a modified OECD scale: 1 for
the first adult in the household (wife or husband), 0.7 for the second parent, 0.6 for children
aged 16 or above, 0.5 for each child between 7 and 15, and 0.4 for each child under age 7.
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Figure 4: Relative welfare gain/loss for wives by decile of equivalized household
income
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Figure 5: Relative welfare gain/loss for husbands by decile of equivalized house-
hold income
15
Table 7: Intra-household welfare effects (wife versus husband)
loss 0 gain total
loss 0.29 0 0.29 0.58
0 0 78.19 0 78.19
gain 2.41 0 18.82 21.24
total 2.70 78.19 19.11 n=1036
Notes: Rows (columns) give the loss or gain in welfare due to the tax reform of wives
(husbands).
the spread of the distribution within income levels is higher for females. The
expected result is that, the higher the equivalent household income, the larger
the welfare impact of family splitting, if any. Well endowed women benefit
most from the reform. Among the 10 percent richest households, for instance,
the wives’ average (mean) gain amounts to 9 percent. Their husbands’ wel-
fare, on the contrary, is hardly affected, with an average gain of close to zero
percent. The inter-quantile range deviates from zero only for the 20 percent
highest income households. Since some wives experience a relatively high gain,
respectively loss, the mean effect runs off the median, for the lowest and highest
deciles of the female income distribution.
A direct comparison of the welfare effects for both spouses is made in Table
7 where the positions of husbands (winner, indifferent, loser) are cross-tabulated
with the positions of their wives. A cut-off of ± 1 percent change defines in-
difference. While the winners clearly outweigh the losers, the most pronounced
result is that of no welfare effect: in 78 percent of the households, neither hus-
band nor wife experiences any change in individual utility through family tax
splitting. Almost 19 percent experience a mutual gain. The remaining families
face conflicting outcomes: though the household as a whole is better off with
the reform, in 2.4 percent of all cases the wife only benefits, while her husband
is negatively affected or indifferent. The reverse happens for less than 1 percent
of the couples.
6 Conclusion
The main result of our simulation study is that the introduction of a family
splitting component within the German tax-benefit system cannot be expected
to have a marked effect on households’ behaviour, except for very well endowed
families. Indeed the existing system of child benefits or allowances in Germany
seems relatively generous for the majority of parents. Its effects are not so
different from those of our family splitting reform with a guaranteed bottom
transfer, at least for the average German household. A switch from marital
to family splitting would have noticeable welfare effects only for high-income
households, particularly for the women in these households. Aggregate labour
supply effects would be close to zero. Only individual working hours would
shift marginally. One reason for these small changes lies in the small number of
children in German families. In particular, better-earning couples in Germany
have only few or no children. Since noticeable welfare impacts were simulated
for multi-children and high-income households only, the scope for changes seems
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particularly small, unless the demographic impact of such a reform turns out to
be large.
First, these findings have to be interpreted in view of a shrinking fiscal bud-
get due to a cut in tax revenues. Second, the treatment of families in the French
tax-benefit system, which includes supplementary benefits for children, is much
more comprehensive than the family splitting reform we implemented for Ger-
man households. But as our adoption of the family splitting grants a minimum
transfer as high as the current German child benefit, these income-dependent
complementary payments would not apply, anyway. Also, the maximum tax sav-
ing in the French family splitting mechanism is much lower than in the German
application. As a result, the behavioural adjustments and welfare changes of
our microsimulation are in every sense an upper bound of what can be expected
from the introduction of a family tax splitting system in Germany.
One drawback of our approach is that we do not distinguish between leisure
and housework when modelling the labour supply decision. Especially house-
wives may be misleadingly assigned more leisure time, and thus more power in
the household. In this case and if this applies to women of high-income house-
holds, our result of a welfare gain for these women will again represent an upper
bound, meaning that the real effects may be even smaller.
Even if the overall effects can hardly be seen from the surface, it has become
evident that the issue of intra-household reallocation and redistribution should
not be neglected when analyzing reforms of the tax-benefit system. Our study
underlines (for rich households) that a higher subsidy for children through family
splitting would benefit, if any, primarily the poorer parent, that is, the wife in
most families.
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Appendix
Definition of the net earning potential
The wife’s net earning potential is defined as follows: let pkf and p
k
m denote
the observed sample frequencies of the discretised weekly labour supplies hk
of wives and husbands, respectively. Denote Rfk
0
mk the household disposable
income when the husband works hk hours and the wife works hk
0
hours, where
k ∈ {0, 10, 20, 30, 40, 50, 60}. The variable yf is defined as:
yf =
KX
k=1
pkm
³
Rf40mk −R
f0
mk
´
. (2)
Estimation of the power index
We first define an index km which parameterises the household’s position on the
Pareto frontier, and which is defined as:
km =
U¯m − Uminm
Umaxm − Uminm
, (3)
where U¯m, Uminm and U
max
m are the effective, minimum and maximum utility
levels the husband can reach as illustrated in Figure 3. Equivalently, we can
define an alternative parameterisation kf with a similar formula for the wife’s
utility levels. In order to take account of the local curvature of the Pareto
frontier, and to obtain power indices that add up to 1, we compute for each
household a scalar α solving the equation kαf + k
α
m = 1, and we call ωf = k
α
f
and ωm = kαm the wife’s and the husband’s power index, respectively. These
numbers are both between 0 and 1. We then set up a logistic equation relating
the calibrated power index of the husband, ωm, to a set of explanatory variables.
This equation of the type ln [ωm/ (1− ωm)] = xγ + ² will allow us to obtain
predicted values ωˆm for the male weight ωˆm between 0 and 1 given x. Important
variables to include in x are variables capturing the way in which the tax benefit
system influences the relative earning power of the spouses. If these turn out to
contribute significantly to the prediction of ωm, they will allow us to describe
changes in the power index induced by tax reforms.
The list of explanatory variables x used to explain the male weight in the
household includes, apart from variable yd described in the text, the husband’s
age, the age difference between the spouses, the husband’s schooling level and
job status, as well as child-related variables. The estimation results, obtained
separately for East and West Germany, are given in Table 8. The husband’s
power index is significantly negatively related to the wife’s relative net earning
potential in the West, but no significant impact was found in the East.
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Table 8: Logistic regression results for the power index
ln [ωm/ (1− ωm)] East Germany West Germany
Explanatory variables Coeff. T-value Coeff. T-value
Wife’s relative net earning power -.15 -5.95
Age -.01 -4.10 -.00 -2.28
Age difference (f −m) .01 3.50
Intermediate schooling (Realschule) .09 2.59
High school degree (Abitur) .10 2.29
No apprenticeship -.33 -2.37
Technical college (Fachschule) .06 3.10
Number of children .05 2.85
Child age 0-3 -.40 -5.29 -.24 -10.06
Child age 3-6 -.20 -4.29 -.10 -5.15
Child age 7-12 -.08 -3.14
Child under 16 -.05 -2.33
Constant -.18 -.10 .18 2.73
Adj. R-squared .1287 .1906
Number of observations 378 954
Data source: Generated microdata based on GSOEP 1998.
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